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[Though] mathematics is often excluded from the arts....such exclusion does not justify denial or neglect of the respects in which litl resembles the arts we do recognize.
-Francis The above comment from a poet and philosopher expresse s an attit ude wi th wh ich ma ny mathematicians would probably feel comfortable.
From at least the time of Aris totle, writers of various philosophical stripes have paid tribute to the aesthetic appeal of mathe matical studies, and today there ex ists a co nside rab le body of introspective literature on the affinities between mathematics and the arts. Certainly the readers of a journal devoted to humanistic mathematics should sympathize with any reaffirmation of their subject's
For example, if we claim aesthetic values are inherent to our doing mathematics, can we in any way specify what those values are or the role they play in our practice?
place among creative human activities . Indeed, to some Sparshott's remar k is surely overcaut ious: Isn't mathematics already an art?
I believe, however, that we sho uld tre at Sparshott' s comment more as a suggestion than as another (and actual ly rather weak) tribute to the aesthetic nature of our subject By virtue of its not assuming mathematics to be an art it encourages us to speculate on the issue. The results of suc h speculation may well be fre sh insights into the nature of mathematics, its role among human endeavors, and even the manner in whic h mathematics education should proceed.
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To see thi s, consider the extent to which the dominant mathematical philosophy of formali sm concentrates on the rigorou s, analytic structure of theories and results as opposed to the complex, creative and often downright hazy methods by which these results are obtained. In the eyes of formalism this is not merely a matter of emphas is-the latter notions are intentionall y brushed aside as irrelelvent to the question "What is mathematics?" (see, e.g., [HI ] ). Can such an approach poss ibly be consistent with the belief that mathematics fundamentally engages our aesthetic Interests, or that il proceeds in manners akin to tho se of art? If we truly feel these things about mathematics, why do we cleave to a philo sophy and to practice s that deny them?
Thus what I see Sparshott suggesting is that we take our generally unexamined beliefs on this issue and examine them seriously. For example, if we claim aes thetic value s are inherent to our doing mathematics, can we in any way speci fy what those value s are or the rol e they play in our practice? If we claim mathematics to be an an by virtue of entailing properties X, Y and Z. are we prepared to counter the charges that with regard to an itself, X is irrelevent, Y in suffucient or Z actually antithetical? Do we know what an is any more than we know what mathematics is? To answer questions like these--even just to ask them intelligently-requires a depth of analysis which few from either the aesthetics/art or mathematics sides of the issue have attempted.
While I make no claim of attaining such a depth in what follows, I do hope I can indicate something of what is likely to be involved in the attempt, and where some of the benefits to be obtained by the effon may lie.
Aesthetics. Art and Mathematics
In keep ing with a practice all too common among writers on this issue, I have thus far been using two different terms-art and aesthetics-in a dangerou sly synonymous way. It is time for a distinction. By aesthetics I mean the particular type of inquiry that Scruton [52, p. 15] characterizes as the "phil o sop hic stud y of beaut y and taste." Similarly, by "aesthetic" I refer either to an attribute suc h an inqu iry would study (e.g., ae sthet ic distance) or to some sys tem that embrace s these notions in a particular way (e.g., a culture or era with an aesthetic different from our own).
An, on the other hand, is a tricki er notion with which to come to grips. Too complex to take as a primitive term, it is one of those co ncepts-like mathematics itselt!-for which we seem to have enough of a sense to use with impunity and still be Like the philosopher of art, we are not so interested in developing the concepts of beauty and taste per se as we are in applying these to a particular-though very broadtype of activity, underst ood-at le ast among people with backgrounds similar to our own. Yet a careful delineation of the concept always seems beyond our grasp. Perhaps we might regard this as good enough, but nagging questions of considerable import nevenheless keep arising: Is such-and-such a wonhy enough work of an to merit our attention? Does its maker merit our support? Should an itself be publi cally suppo rted? Should it be taught in schools? Can it be taught at all ? As might be expected, the closer we get to the "edges" of the co ncept-to education, to ethics, to the bounda ries of " no n-a rt"-the tougher the questi ons get. Hence arises the philosophy of art.
Al though historical precedents for co nfusion are ample, it is almost cenainly mistaken to equate this laner field with aesthetics [see 54, pp. So wher~doe s thi s put us with regard to mathematics? Ideally, we might wish to establish a relati onship between aesthetics and the philo sophy of math emati c s analogous to that between aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Problems immedi ately ari se, however. On the one hand, many of the concepts of aesthetics have developed (eve n if co ntroversially so) with specific reference to an, and applying these as they now stand to mathematics may be unwarranted. But even more troublesome difficulties arise from the side of the philosophy of mathematics itself, which in this century has so estranged itself from aesthetic concerns that prospects for an immediate dialogue seem dim. The two disciplines apparently lack a common language.
It is here that we might appeal to the philosophy of art. Like the philosopher of an, we are not so interested in developing the concepts of beauty and taste per se as we are in applying these to a parti cul ar-though very broad-type of activity. Similarly, we should be willing to admit that the most important aspects of our subject may well lie outside the realm of aesthetics. Finally, we can note from the stan that several important concepts in the philosophy of art (e.g., representation, form, the distinction between pure and applied activities) bear prima facie resemblance with concepts in mathematics. Po ssibly this is no more than a superficial coincidence, but again this is a point requiri ng demonstration. Note that this essentialist approach-that of reducing art to necessary and sufficient conditions-promi ses a re sult not unlike those formulas for the identity of mathematics (e.g., "Mathematics is logic". or "Mathematics is the study of formal systems") that have arisen in our own field. The resemblance is deeper than thi s, however. Th e very attempts to specify the se qualities in each subject have themselves paralleled each other in remarkable and significant manners.
Although any atte mp t to classify diverse theories runs the risk of oversimplification, I shall deal here with three general forms of essentialist arguments.
The first, realism, involves identifying this essence Leonardo declared that, " Truly painting is a science, the true born child of nature" and some three centuries later the landscapist Constable reaffirmed: "Painting is a science, and should be pursued as an inquiry into the laws of Nature."
in some relationship between a co nstructed object (or "artifact" ) and a world exterior both to that objec t and its maker. By contrast, expressioni sm concentrates o n relationship s betw een the artifact and a world interior to either its maker, audience or both. Fin ally, formalism identifies the e ssence of art strictly in terms of qualities contained within the artifact itself-e.g., the lines , colors or shapes in a painting, the arran gem ent of tone s in a mu sical composition, etc.
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I do not wish to imply that all essentialist theories fit snugly into these categories. Hybrid theories combining elements from each of these also exist. as do theories that strike otTin different. often quite sophisticated and radical, directions (see, e.g., [Til & [D3] ). For introductory purposes, however, this scheme (which parallels that of [H5] ) should be adequate, and will also serve to highlight the parallels between traditional philosophies of an and mathematics. Let us briefly consider each in turn.
Realism
For centuries realistic views had constituted the dominant theories of an, and although these attitudes have generally fallen from favor, both artists and audiences alike continue to beinfluenced by their appeal. While a broad spectrum of realistic views are possible, these theories in general identify art as a system of knowledge with a status claim not entirely unlike that of science. Most explicitly, Leonardo declared that, "T ruly painting is a science, the true born child of nature" and some three centuries later the landscapist Constable reaffirmed: "Painting is a science, and should be pursued as an inquiry into the laws of Nature." By these lights (which can be clearly discerned in the works of Aristotle), the arti st reveals reality to us through ab stract representations of its various aspects-aspects incapable of such revelation by any means but art . In some variations of the theory, these revelations are actually of a "higher" plane of reality than mere physical existence. For example, Piet Mondrian viewed his skeletal arrangements of lines and solid colors as presenting ima ges of "true reality and true life," a position more akin to nee-Platonism than the indu ctive reali sm of Ari stotle. These views are linked, however, by a conception of art as essentially a means of discovering truth.
Have attitudes such as the se ever been displayed toward o ur mathematical "artifacts," and are they still likely to exert an influence on us today? To both que stions the answers are definitely yes. For centuries Euclid ean geometry did not stand as one of a multitude of formal geometric systems but was regarded as representing the Real geometry of Real Space, ba sed on inductively self-evident truths abstracted from reality and developed through the unassailable method of deduction. (Writing before Eucl id, Aristotle accurately o bserved some of the consequences of rejecting the assertion that the sum of the angles in any triangle was two right angles. He abandoned these conclusions because of their "obvious" inability to square with the evidence of experience. Spherical geometry, of course. had already developed a long history, but this was Real geometry on a Real surfaco--not a model of a nonEuclidean system. See [T3J.) True, the insistence upon logical deduction may appear outwardly to be difficult to reconcile with an, but I believe this percepti on largely arises from simultaneous tendencies to downp lay the role of logical development in an and to overplay its role in mathematics. The logical "flaws" in Euclid's geometry or Newton' s calculus were recognized as profoundly troublesome, but these problems were as little compared to the practical insights and successes the systems as a whole presented (see [KIl) . The knowledge gleaned from mathematics was looke d upo n as genuine knowl edge nonetheless, and throughout this period there was little doubt that this knowledge was that of reality.
The rise of non-Euclidean geometry required abandonment of this geometry-as-the-science-ofreal-space conception, but by no means did it spell the end of realist conceptions of mathematics. By one view. different geometries or systems of mathematics could be conceived as separate entities of a Platonic world of forms , with the mathematician regarded as a sort of suprascientist who discovers the properties of these entities. And
Thus while we may be accustomed to referring to the Mona Lisa itself as a work of art, the work of art proper lies in the imaginative constructions that resulted in Leonardo's painting it and in our interpreting it.
alth ough this position ignores seve ral not incon siderable aspects of Plato' s thought o n mathematics, the belief that any well-framed mathematical question has a definite answer indepen dent of our existence characterizes the position known as mathematical Platonism. Phrased in this manner, the position becomes as much the creed of a mathematical theology as it does the basis of a descriptive philosophy. As the former it seems to be of practical value to individual mathematicians [see. e.g., TI]; as a critical theory it seems as suspect as Mondrian's supposed ability to envision "true reality." Did art experience its own "non-Euclidean revolution?" In a sense it did, even if its occurence cannot be as prec isely specified as that of mathematics.
(Although the late-18th and early-19th centuries figure prominently in the revolutions in both fields. See [AI] .) The process in this case involved-at least in pan-the realization that representation itself was neither a necessary nor suffi cient condition for art. Its insufficiency (long recogni zed ) can be ascertained simply by considering common occurences of representation that do not qualify as art: courtroom records, plastic anatomi cal mode ls, or snapshots (the history of photography's status as an art provides an interesting trial case of realistic theories). But even more telling is the apparent case for unnecessity. Not only do non-representational artworks exist. but entire branches of art appear to be non-representational by nature. Debussy's La Mer may be taken to represent the sea, but does not this conclusion follow primarily by virtue of the work's title alone? Without this title. would the work still be perceived as resembling the sea more than it does anything else? Would we even consider the work in representational terms? Would we still consider it a work of an? (For this example see [H5, p. 708J.) Emile Zola-one of the late 19th century's most prominent exponents of realism through his ideal of the naturali stic "experimental novel"-once characteri zed art as life seen through a "temperment." But even from before the time of Zola it had become increasingly apparent that realistic theories had been in error in not placing more emphasis on the role of this "ternperment" itself. In the philosophies of expressionism this role would lie at the very heart of the matter.
Expressionism
For an example of an extreme expressionist view. consider the theory developed in the first half of this century by the philosophers Benedetto Croce [C2J and R. G. Collingwood [CI) . (These are actually separate theories, but close enough in both spirit and detail to be regarded as one for our purposes.) In this theory an is taken as being identical with expression. the revealing of an internally construc ted mental state. Even more simply. art is realized imagi native activ ity. and in fact stan ds as the most basic fonn of human lang uage. Although this is a panicul arly bro ad pronouncement. it is accompanie d by explicit statements of what an is not. First (and possibly most difficult ly) it is not any se t of existi ng physical or sym bolic art ifacts such as pai ntings. texts or sculpture s. These are simply the necessary embodiments of the imaginative constructions that Collingwood calls the " work[s] of an proper" [CI, p. 37] . Thus while we may be accustomed to referring to the Mon a Lisa itself as a work of art, the work of art proper lie s in the imaginative constructions that resulted in Leonardo's painting it and in our interpreting it. (Along the se line s Collin gwood appro vingly quotes Coleridge 's "we know a man for a poet by the fact that he makes us poets" [CI, p. 1I 8J.) Similarly, an should nOI be confused with any particular kinds of media. The se. rath er, are simp ly the necessary channels through which particular expre ssions flow. (Again from CoIlingwood: "Every gesture that each one of us makes is a work of an" [C I, p. 285]) Finally, art should not be ide ntified with any activity engaged in for a specific purpose or outcome. Art may be used to represent reality, entertain us or persuade us, but it does these things en pas sant, Ind eed. if any spec ific purpose guides the production of a work we are dea ling not with an at all, but with craft or tech no-what Collingwood calls "an falsely so-called."
This last may seem to place art in a paradoxical position. On the one hand it is equivalent to the most basic human attribute (communication) and on the other it is divorced from purposive human activiti es. This is resolved through the nature of the internal constructions of emotion s, intuitions an d ex perie nce s tha t re sult in successful expr essions. Colli ngwood exp lains that to attain these the arti st mu st " e xpe rien ce what a ll experience" and commen ts that " in ivory towers art lan guished" [CI , p . 119] . Similar ly, Croce disposes of the romantic no tion of the artist as necessari ly bei ng a specimen of genius (a view which also haunt s mathematics) by not ing that "in spiration is not something from heaven, but is in the essence of humanity itself." and that «the man of genius who poses as that...finds his punishment in beco ming somew hat ridicu lous" [C2, p. 16] . In this theory arti sts are born and not made , but we are all born artists. Differences are of degree, not of kind .
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It may seem unlikely that there could be an overall vie w of mathemat ic s correspo nding to an expressionist theory of art-particularly a theory as extreme as that of Croce and Collingwood. It is some what startling to find. therefore. that it is not difficult to find particu lar passages in these writer ' s works which are virtually identical to ones found in the work of such figure s as poincare. Brouwer and it is above all mistaken to confuse matbematics with its final symbolic forms, These, rather, are merely the manifestations of the internal constructive processes that constitute the proper identity of mathematics.
late r members of the constructivist school. Consider Brouwer's intuitionism [B] . To Brouwer it is above all mi stak en to co nfuse mathematics with its final symbolic fonns. These. rather, are merel y the manife st at ions of the internal construc tive proce sses that co nstitute the proper identity of mathematics. Other mathematicians may use their interpretation of these symbols as a basis for their own constructions, but their interpretation is itself a personal construction. (Sparshott notes that both he and H. S. M. Coxeter know the Pythagorean theorem, but that what "he knows in knowin g it is something I can not even imagine" [S4, p. 33] .) To Brouwer, logical rules do not guide the process of mathematical construction; rather. a pragmatic logic is effectively created along the way . Similarly, Collingwood notes that the artist does not create rules so much as construct them. The se viewpoints do not leave judgements in either acti vity purely subjective. however. In mathematics, such judgements are constrained by the requirement of constructive existence; in art by the conunonality of actual human experience. Even on the point where the theories apparently diverge most severely-the co nception of language-the difficulty red uces to a difference in terminology . Croc e and ColHn gwood conclude that art is language, whereas Brouwer vinually declares that mathematics is an ything but language. But to Collingwood, langua ge is an y expression of intern al con struction s; to Brou wer language is primarily sym bolic notation (which Collingwood refers to as "lan guage falsely so-called" and Croce as " the mere grammatical").
Though these theories may assume different names in different field s-expressionism in art, intuitioni sm or con structivism in mathematics-all share a focus upon the freedom and constraints of the creative process as e ssential to the activity at hand. In an. expressionism has been particularl y criticized for its apparen t disre gard for the arti stic product as an entity onto itself-the theory' s notion of art istic exi stence appears skewed [H4}.
Similarly, mathematical construc tivism establi shes a criterion of existence often viewed as unnece ssarily severe ( [ill] ). In response to the se charges in both areas , philosophies of fonnalism---already present in each field-have arisen as alternatives.
Formalism
Whether in mathematics or in art. formalism in its pure st state is a philosophy of detachment.
Artw orks and mathematical systems are viewed as independent phenomena standing apan from their creators, their audiences and any external world. Meanings or values ca n be con sidered only with reference to elements contained with in the work itself. And although ideal formalist criticism may be diffi cult to achieve in practic e, in that ideal works stand apart even from the history of their very construct ion. As Werhane puts it, a work exi sts virtually " in spite of its creator...and its audience" [W4, p. 99J .
I should make at least one distinction among formal theories, however-particularly with respect to an. In the pure state de scribed above-a position sometimes referred to as absolutism-the meaning of a work is entirely separated from any quality not within the work itself. Thu s to recognize a work of an is to recognize such qualities as symmetry, internal dynamics or the relationships of color and shape; to create an is to impose these qualities on an artifac t. How ever, in another brand o f formalism it is important that one look at both the formal structure of a work as well as any meanings that may be expressed by that struc ture. Art effectively becomes defined as symbolic fonn. BUI unless one wishes to regard virtuall y everything from everyday language through, say, mathematics as art . a more precise descriptio n of what constitutes artistic forms is needed. Such theories-as for example those of Suzanne K.
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Langer IL] or Nelson Goodman [02]---<:volve largely into " meta-theories" of syntactic and semantic rules , and thus to a large extent diverge from pure formali sm, Simultaneously, however, they also seem to diverge from the actual exp eri ence of creating and appreciating an.
Wri ting with regard to Langer's theory, Scruton comme nts that her "analysis gives no procedure for Whether in mathematics or in art, formalism in its purest state is a philosophy of detachment. Artworks and mathematical systems are viewed as independent phenomena standing apart from their creators, their audiences and any external world, interpretation, nothing that would give application to the claim that in understanding a work of art we understand it as a sym bol" [52, p. 22] .
In mathematics, pure fonnalism---comparable to aesthetic absolutism-is that view which takes mathematics to be strictly the study of formal systems (see [HI] ). Where the formalist in art seeks internal structure, the mathematical formalist seeks con sistency. Where the former detaches meaning or expression from form. the latter constructs "uninterpreted" systems.
I feel compelled here to mention that Hilbert (the "father of formalism") was not a formalist in this sense, as his introduction to Geometry and the Imagination [H3] makes abundantly clear. The metamathematical strategy of Hilbert's Program requ ired him to treat mathematical systems as uninterpreted for the sake of a consistency proofhardly the same as believing mathematics itself to be fundamentally uninterpretable or meaningless. Curry, one of the leading exponents of math emati cal formalism, has himself stated that "it is unfortunate that many persons identify fonna1ism with what should be called Hilbertism" [C3, p. 156] . Indeed, it would be interesting to determi ne the degree to which the aims and methods of metamathematics in general parallel those of, say. Goodman's strategy in Languages of Art [02J.
In both mathematics and art formalism has become the most established theoretic view of this century. (In both fields , in fact, it has independently acquired the descriptive phrase "Modernism.'} In mathematics education, its influence-under the pervasive guidance of Bourbaki and the New Ma th-has been nearly universal. However, as Davis and Hersh ([D4, ) note, cracks have begun to sho w in the formalist wall. The underlying the me of both [D4] and [D5] is in essence an assa ult on mathematical formali sm, as are the selections in [T4] . Similarly. many of the es says in Arthur Dante ' s recent collecti on [D2] constitute strong cases against aesthetic formali sm and its sep aration from human experience and meaning.
Non-Essentialism
In an often anthologize d paper, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics" [WI] the philosopher Morris Weitz argued that the entire essentialist approach to the philosophy of an is fundamentally misguided (see also [W3] In mathematics, pure formalismcomparable to aesthetic absolutism-is that view which takes mathematics to be strictly the study of formal systems. Where the formalist in art seeks internal structure, the mathematical formalist seeks consistency. flexible in that it is always capable of expanding its sc ope to embrace previou sly unconsidered artifacts, styles , media, e tc. It is perenially de batable in that not only are the criteria by which new works are judged subject to continual criticism and reevalu at ion , but even establi shed works continue to fall under such scrutiny. Oed ipus Rex may be established as a masterpiece of tragedy, but the matter of exac tly which of its qualities grant it that status continues to be contentious.
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Weitz bases his discussion in Wingenstein's notion of family resemblance [W5, pp. 31-331_ To use Wittgenstein's example, if we are confronted with the question "What is a game?" we shall find ourselves unable to provide a satisfactory set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Not all games have rules, not all involve competition, not all are purely recreational, etc. What we can do is point out resemblances between those entitities which we have chosen to call games. If a new candidate for gamehood presents itself, we base our decision whether to expand the concept to embrace it on the resemblances we perceive between the new activity and those previously admitted. Weitz notes that with regard to an we could always choose to "close the concept" by legislating strict standards of admittance, but to do so would, as he puts it, "foreclose on creativity"-a seemingly selfdefeating decision.
This last approach-that of choosing to close the concept-is the option foundational philosophies of mathematics seem to offer. But when mathematics is regarded primarily as an activity (i.e.. historically. culturally and in actual practice) this option as well seems to be a particularly selfdefeating decision. Viewed this way, in fact. mathematics increasingly presents itself as a flexible and debatable open concept. As an example, consider the attitudes mathematicians have historically held regarding the existence of infinitesimal s. Does the long history of this issue between the times of Eudoxus and modem nonstandard analysis suggest anything but the perennial flexibility and debatabiliry of this concept? What of "dimension," "continuity," or "real number?" Perhaps most teIlingly. consider the notion of "proof." Is this a closed concept, or have our criteria of what constitutes a valid mathematical argument themselves been (and continue to be) flexible and debatable? Consider the positions available with regard to the use of computers in proof. Tymockzo [T4, pp. 243-266] asks whether if we regard the a-color theorem as having been proved. must we not also admit that its proof is of an entirely different nature from any that have come before it? Although Weitz co nsiders essentalist arguments to be misguided in purpose, he does not consider the particular issues they raise to be irrelevant. These theories provide, in fact, "a series of invaluable...directions for attending to art," and concludes that: Similarly. if we demand of our philosophies of mathematic s a sec ure foundation capable of supporti ng the entire struc ture of the subject we may well be fundamentally misguided. Howe ver, foundational phil osophies have been succe ssful in raising relevant issues and thereby provoking us to fresh insights. In both art and mathematics, nonessentialism move s us toward a pluralistic view of our endeavors, one that recognizes that there is not a single, absolute perspective but many-possibly not even mutually consistent-viewpoints. By no means, however, should pluralism be co nfused with a kind of bland eclecticism or---even worse--blind subjectivism. On the contrary. the holding of finn ind ividual views is probably necessary to create the produc tive tensions that dri ve ou r activ ities as a whole. One can be generally nonpluralist with regard to one 's own philosophy and generally pluralist with regard to mathematics or an as a whole. (For a discussion of this stance with regard to an see Danto's "Learning to Live with Pluralism" in [02] ).
The reco gnition of both an and mathe matics as open con cepts leaves behind it a curious casuality. The claim that mathematics is an an seems to have lost its meanin g. But in its place has arisen the pro spect of a much more active agenda-that of see king family rese mblances between the two fields. That any resemblances we find are indeed familial ones I do not find objec tio nable-e-rhe underlying co nceptions of the essenti alist theories in each fiel d j ust ifies their membershi p in a common philosophical "family." In the remainder of this article] would like to address ju st a few of the areas where some useful resemblances of this kind might be sought.
Family Resemblances between Art and Mathematics
Mathematics and Techne
One of the central points in the Croce-Collingwood theory is the distinction between art and techne, or craft. Rec all that in thi s theory the form er is 16 equivalent to e xpressio n, while the latter is identified with activities engaged in to attain a specific result Even without wholly accepting this theory, the desire for such a distinction seems desirable. Techne is composed of specific, trainable skills; an not only marshals these skills. but transcends them in some not clearly defmeable manner. Mixing paints or mastering scales is techne; The Madonna of the Rocks or an original j a zz improvisation is art.
Propaganda as propaganda is tecbne; propaganda in the fonn of Eisenstein's Potemkin somehow becomes art.
A similar distinction seems valid in mathematics, and could well be crucial in education. Finding the greatest common divisor of two numbers through following some recipe is techne; deriving a process along the lines of Euclid's algorithm, convincing oneself and others that it works, or deve loping a geometric interpretation of it (in short, understanding it) is mathematics. Even a brief peru sal of most sec ondary level textbooks or examin ations reve als a tremendous emphasis on techne. But to what degree are " skills" nonethele ss necessary , and which particular ones? Can and shou ld these be appro ached in a more "mathem atical" manner? If mathematics proper is something that cannot bedirectly taught. how can it
In both art and mathematics, nonessentialism moves us toward a pluralistic view of our endeavors, one that recognizes that there is not a sing le, absolute perspective but many-possibly not even mutually consistent-viewpoin ts, be productively devel oped ? Approaching these issue s seems to require a sharper disitnction between " math proper" and "math fal sely so- A final ope n note on this subject: The mathltechne di stinction appe ars to cut across that of pure/applied mathematics, and in certain respects may prove to be more a fruitful one. Th ese top ics have not been en tirely alien to math em ati cs, even if they have not bee n approached in terms of the overrid ing concept of sty le. Co mpari sons of Greek and modern mathematic s have often been approached with rega rd to wha t are effec tive ly stylis tic considerat ions, and fro m at least the time of Poin care writers have contrasted individual geomeoi c "s tyles" with arithmetic or analytic ones. However, style has not played the unifying role in historical or philosophical studies of mathematical thinking that it has in art. Possibly this is due to an attitude which views mathematical progress in a deterministic, unitary manner-a great chain of mathematical being, so to speak.
There have been indications of change. Educators speak of the role of "cognitive styles" and "multiple representations" in the learning of the subjec t, and Oue has written of a "complementary" relationship between arithmetic and geo metry which is as suggestive of corresponding artistic styles or media as it is of modern physics [O J. Furthermore, the emerging field of ethnomathe matics ([01 1& [A2] ) seems to offer a particularly fresh approach to the nature of mathematical styles developed outside traditonal academic settings. Possibly all these workers may have something to gain from the methods and results of art history and psychology with respect to style.
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One funhe r note along these lines: In [D4, p. 318 of stylistic change might provide a better handle on thi s phenomenon than one which views the development of mathematics as analagous to that of science.
Ethics
If the philosophy of art often seems a rath er dry and erudite affair, there is at least one set of issues over which it becomes both heated and publicthat of censorship and the moral obligations of the artist. Are there general topics from which the artist. or particular works from which the public, should be restricted access? Similarly. is the artist obliged to deal with any partic ular topics or situations? If each of the opposed paths of strict mor alism and unrestri cted aestheticism appea r undesireable, what positions are left open to us? These have been among the most discussed issues in the philosop hy of art, and can be traced from such figures as Confucious and Heraclitu s through current commentators on the role of the National Endowment for the Arts, Issue s of a simila r nature have arisen more frequently in mathemati cs in recent years. (Davis and Hersh [D4, contrast the extreme ethical positions of "Mathematical Maoism" and a form of mathemati cal aes theticism derivedperhaps inaccurately-from Hardy.) In general, however, mathematics (and to a slightly less extent, science) has been disappointingly slow in embracing such topics. As more mathematicians and educators enter into such discu ssions, it may well be to their advantage to acquaint themselves with the manners in which the corresponding issues have been approached with respect to art. It might be worthwh ile to point out here on e particular area in which the functioning of each of mathematics, art and sc ience have gro wn tremendously similar: All to a large degree depend primarily for support on governmental or industrial support ("pa tronage"). The time is ripe for a genuine dialogue between these areas on this issue alone.
Aesthetic Issu es
Oddly enough, purely aesthetic considerations have made few appearances in this discussion. If we were to adopt a strictly Platonic view of either art or mathematics we might account for this simply through invokin g Keats: Beauty is truth, truth beauty. Thou gh a simplification, this formula nonetheless captures much of the attitude that allowed realistic views of art and mathematics to coexi st for centuries with formal conceptions of beauty (as outli ned in Plato's Philebus). To a modem day formalist, on the other hand, aesthetic con sideration s may well be deemed irrelevant, either relegated to the "emotive" qualities of the positivists, or actually defined as the meeting of certain formal criteria. Neither of these positions, however, is particularly helpful in ascertaining the role or nature of aesthe tic j udgements in actually creating art or mathematics. This is a topic on which the mathematical literature is vinually mute. Poincare [P4, p. 392J wrote of aesthetics as serving the role of the "delicate sieve" throu gh wh ic h successful mathematical "combin ati o ns" passed on their way to con sciousness, but his sugge stive metaphor has remained li ttle more than that for some nine 18 decades. (Though some interesting development is attained in [Pt] .) This is not to imply that the artistic literature has itself resolved the problems posed by the creative imagination, but it has approached them directly and arrived at apparently useful di sti ncti on s and in sights. This same literature may provide a fertile starting ground for mathematical investigations. For an introduction to these issues from philosophical and psychological persepctives, see [SI] and [P3] , respectively. 1 would like to mention briefly one aesthetic value which does seem to be pervasive in the mathematical literature-that of elegance. As aesthetic values go, this seems to be rather peculiar If we were to adopt a strictly Platonic view of either art or mathematics we might account for this simply through invoking Keats: Beauty is truth. truth beauty.
to mathematical studies. (Indeed, the word actually canies a somewhat negative connotation in, say, painting or music.) Far from being able 10separate the positive or negative effects this concept has had on development, mathematical writers have not even been particularly clear on just what elegance is or how it stands in relation to such other concepts as clarity, conviction, understanding or significance . It is, however, an aesthetic value (or at least an apparent aesthetic value) with some degree of currency in the mathematical community , and as such may provide an entry point for approach ing the nature of mathematical aesthetics in general. My own suspicion is that an overly formal conception of elegance-say one strictly in terms of efficiency-s-could hinder development as much as it motivates it, whereas a pluralistic view of various attitudes could be genuinely productive . I would greatly appreciate hearing others' views on mathematical elegance-particularly examples of what they find to be elegant and some (however imprecise) description of what leads them to say so. (Questions: Does your conception of elegance primarily involve results or procedures? Does visualization have anything to do with it? Are there arguments which you find convincing but still not satisfying?)
C onclus ion
Perhaps the most appropriate way to close this article is to refer again to the epigraph with which it opened. Superficially, mathematics may appear as the most austere of human endeavors: rigorous, analytic and precise. More deeply, it reveals itself as one of the most mysterious. aspiring to aspects of experience most commonly associated with philosophy or religion (both of which, incidentally, Hegel concl uded art eventually becomes). To understand mathematic s at this deeper level-to grasp it as a human activity whic h itself human izes-c-requires a perspective that embraces other humanist endeavors. An-in its richness, its mysteries and its humanism-offers an abundant wealth of experience and insight from which mathematics may have much to learn of itself.
